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JURISDICTION 
T h i s c a s e was t r a n s f e r r e d by t h e U t a h S u p r e m e 
C o u r t t o t h e Utah Cour t of Appea l s on August 12 , 1988 . 
J u r i s d i c t i o n i s v e s t e d i n t h e U t a h C o u r t o f A p p e a l s 
p u r s u a n t t o U t a h Code 7 8 - 2 a - 3 ( 2 ) ( h ) ( U t a h Code 1987-
1988) and Rule 4A(a) of t h e Ru les of t h e Utah C o u r t o f 
A p p e a l s . 
NATURE OF LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS 
D e f e n d a n t s / R e s p o n d e n t s made a m o t i o n f o r summary 
j u d g m e n t u n d e r R u l e 56 o f t h e U t a h R u l e s of C i v i l 
P r o c e d u r e . Sa id mot ion f o r summary judgment was g r a n t e d 
and judgment was e n t e r e d a g a i n s t P l a i n t i f f s / A p p e l l a n t s by 
t h e H o n o r a b l e R o n a l d 0 . Hyde i n t h e S e c o n d J u d i c i a l 
D i s t r i c t Cour t of Weber County , S t a t e of U t a h . 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l a r e a s f o l l o w s : 
1. Whether the granting of Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment was proper where m a t e r i a l f a c t s were 
p r o p e r l y r a i s e d and a d i s p u t e e x i s t e d with regard 
t he r e to . 
2. Whe the r t h e l o w e r C o u r t e r r e d when i t 
dismissed P l a i n t i f f ' s claims for negligent 
1 
misrepresentation but preserved the claim for fraud, 
because if the evidence does not support fraud, it may 
support misrepresentation or deceit. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted 
in the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, 
State of Utah. 
The Plaintiffs sought to recover damages from ^f* 
Defendants because the Defendants constructed a home that 
obstructed the view of the Plaintiffs after Defendants 
had represented to Plaintiffs that Defendants would not 
construct any buildings which would obstruct the view 
from Plaintiffs' dwellings in the Lakeview Heights 
Subdivision, located in North Ogden, Utah. The 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint contained eight separately stated 
causes of action: fraud; negligent misrepresentation; 
negligence; breach of fiduciary duty; private nuisance; 
violations of easements for light, air and view; breach 
of declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions; 
and punitive damages. All but a part of one of 
Plaintiffs' causes of action were dismissed by the Court 
when it granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
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No t r i a l was held on the matter. P l a i n t i f f s appealed to 
t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t , and t h e c a s e was t h e n 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals• 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On November 14, 1980, Reid Evans and Norma T. 
Evans purchased lot 149 in the Lakeview Heights 
Subdivision located in North Ogden, Weber County, Utah. 
(R.114). On June 5, 1981, James R. and Barbara W. 
Loosemore purchased lot 148 of the same subdivision. 
(R.114). On April 29, 1983, William M. and Helen C. 
Masters purchased lot 129 of the same subdivision. (R. 
114). (The Evans, Loosemores and Masters are hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs" or 
"Purchasers".) 
2. The Lakeview Heights Subdivision was platted 
and filed with the Weber County Recorder on October 19, 
1977, and an amended plat of the subdivision was filed 
with the Weber County Recorder on June 23, 1983. 
(R.115). 
3. The lots in the Lakeview Heights Subdivision 
were advertised as view lots commanding an unobstructed 
view of the Great Salt Lake and surrounding valley. 
(R.117). 
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4. Prior to the Evans1 purchase of lot 149, the 
Defendants represented to Reid Evans that lot 150 of the 
Lakeview Heights Subdivision was "too narrow to build 
on,11 and that Defendants were never going to take away 
the Evans1 view. (Exhibit G to Defendants1 Memorandum in 
Support, page 32 - no trial record page number is set 
forth on said exhibit.) 
5. Defendants, or their agents, represented on 
numerous occasions to the Plaintiffs that Defendants 
would never allow or construct any residential dwelling 
on lot 150 of the Lakeview Heights Subdivision that would 
obstruct, impair, or in any way negate the view from the 
purchasers' dwellings. (R.117). 
6. After the Plaintiffs purchased their 
respective lots, the Defendants or their agents requested 
the Plaintiffs to sign a petition for a variance on lot 
149. (R. 115). 
7. As an inducement for the Plaintiffs to sign 
the variance, the Defendants represented to Plaintiffs 
that the Defendants would not construct any residential 
dwelling on lot 150 which would obstruct, impair or in 
any way negate the view from the Plaintiffs* dwellings. 
(R.115). 
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8. The Defendants b u i l t , or allowed to be b u i l t , 
a r e s i d e n t i a l d w e l l i n g on l o t 150 t h a t o b s t r u c t s , 
impa i r s , and nega tes the P l a i n t i f f s 1 view from the i r 
dwell ings. (R.117). 
9. On September 9, 1985, the P l a i n t i f f s f i led 
s u i t against the Defendants (R.l) and on October 3, 1985, 
t h e Defendan t s f i l e d t h e i r answer t o P l a i n t i f f s ' 
Complaint. (R. 19). 
10. On November 7, 1986, the P l a in t i f f s f i led an 
Amended Complaint (R.112) and on November 24, 1986, the 
Defendan t s f i l e d an answer t o P l a i n t i f f s 1 Amended 
Complaint. (R. 127). 
11. The P l a i n t i f f s 1 Amended Complaint se t s forth 
e i g h t s epa ra t e causes of a c t i o n : f r a u d ; n e g l i g e n t 
misrepresentat ion; negligence; breach of fiduciary duty; 
p r iva te nuisance; v io la t ion of easements for l i gh t , a i r 
and view; breach of declarat ion of covenants, conditions 
and r e s t r i c t i o n s of the Lakeview Heights Subdivision; and 
puni t ive damages. (R.118 through 123). 
12. On January 5, 1988, Defendants f i led a motion 
for summary judgment. (R.226). Said motion was supported 
by a Memorandum in Support. (R. 228). Attached as 
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E x h i b i t s to the Defendants' Memorandum in Support were 
e x c e r p t s from t h e d e p o s i t i o n s of t h e P l a i n t i f f s . 
13. On January 21, 1988, the P l a i n t i f f s f i led a 
Memorandum in Opposi t ion to De fendan t s 1 mot ion fo r 
summary judgment. (R.312 and 330). Attached as Exhibits 
to P l a i n t i f f s 1 Memorandum in Opposition are excerpts from 
the deposi t ions of the P l a i n t i f f s . 
14. Af te r a hear ing on Defendants* motion for 
summary judgment, Defendants submit ted to the Court a 
Reply B r i e f in support of t h e i r motion for summary 
judgment. (R.249). The Defendants did not a t t a c h any 
a f f idav i t s to t he i r Reply Brief. 
15. On J a n u a r y 25 , 1988, P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d an 
o b j e c t i o n t o P l a i n t i f f s ' Reply B r i e f . ( R . 2 6 0 ) . 
P l a i n t i f f s attached to the i r Objection the a f f idav i t of 
Mr. Robert Ward. (R.257). 
16. The m a t e r i a l f a c t s as s e t f o r t h by t h e 
Defendants to support t he i r motion for summary judgment, 
are cons i s ten t ly disputed by the P l a i n t i f f s deposi t ions , 
attached a f f idav i t , and the submissions on f i l e . (See 
record numbers as set forth above). 
17. On March 16, 1988, the lower court granted 
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Defendants1 motion for summary judgment. (R.380). The 
Court's ruling on the Defendants' motion dismissed all of 
the causes of action as set forth in the Plaintiffs' 
Complaint except fraud in the inducement at the time of 
purchase. (R.309). The Court ruled there were 
insufficient facts to show that the representations by 
the Defendants would be actionable. (R.308). 
18. Defendants voluntarily dismissed the remaining 
partial cause of action to avoid the necessity of trying 
said claim while the remaining causes of action were 
being appealed. (R.423). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The P l a i n t i f f s b r o u g h t an a c t i o n t o r e c o v e r 
damages c a u s e d by t h e f r a u d u l e n t o r n e g l i g e n t 
representa t ions made by the Defendants or Defendants ' 
employees to P l a i n t i f f s to induce the P l a i n t i f f s to 
purchase lo t s in the Lakeview Heights Subdivision, and to 
induce P l a i n t i f f s to sign a variance regarding what could 
be c o n s t r u c t e d on an a d j a c e n t l o t i n t h e same 
s u b d i v i s i o n . P l a i n t i f f s re l i ed on the representa t ions 
made by the Defendants to t he i r detriment and purchased 
the i r homes. 
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Summary judgment i s a p p r o p r i a t e only where the 
fac t s , viewed in a l i gh t most favorable to the r e s i s t i n g 
p a r t y , show with c e r t a i n t y t h a t no genuine issues of 
m a t e r i a l f ac t e x i s t and where t h e moving p a r t y i s 
en t i t l ed to judgment as a matter of law. In the case at 
bar, there are genuine issues of material f a c t and the 
Defendants are not e n t i t l e d to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
The r e c o r d c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e a r e 
d i s p u t e s as to m a t e r i a l f a c t s r ega rd ing whether the 
P l a i n t i f f s re l i ed to t h e i r detriment on substant ive =*nd 
material representa t ions made by Defendants and whether 
said representat ions by Defendants were of a t o r t i o u s 
na ture . The P l a i n t i f f s should have been allowed the 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r o c e e d on a t h e o r y of n e g l i g e n t 
misrepresentation as well as fraud in order to al low a 
jury to determine whether or not the to r t ious conduct of 
the Defendants was in ten t iona l or negl igent . The lower 
C o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l of a l l but the i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t of 
fraud was p re jud ic ia l e r ro r . 
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ARGUMENT 
POIHT I 
THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT PROPER WHERE 
MATERIAL FACTS WERE PROPERLY RAISED AND 
A DISPUTE EXISTED WITH REGARD THERETO. 
The lower Court erred in granting Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment because there are genuine 
issues of material fact that must be adjudicated. 
Further, the lower Court erred in granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment because, under the cloud of 
uncertainty raised by the depositions and pleadings on 
file, the lower Court could not grant judgment to 
Defendants as a matter of law. 
The long standing rule in Utah regarding the 
granting of a motion for summary judgment, is summarized 
in Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987): 
When reviewing the grant of a motion for 
summary judgment, the facts are to be 
liberally construed in favor of the parties 
opposing the motio* and those parties are 
to be given the benefit of all inferences 
which might reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence. Summary judgment is proper only 
when the defendants are entitled to it as a 
matter of law on the undisputed facts. 
743 P.2d at 187. See also Geneva Pipe Company v. S.H. 
Ins . Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986); Jensen v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 611 P.2d 363, 365 (Utah 
1980). 
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The standard of review for the Court to follow in 
considering a motion for summary judgment is found in 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc» v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 
776 (Utah 1984): "In considering a summary judgment, we 
consider the record in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion, resolving all doubts in his 
favor." Id* at 778. See also Concepts, Inc. v. First 
Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 
1987); Atlas Corp. v. The Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 
225 (Utah 1987); Lockhart Company v. Equitable Realty 
Company, 657 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Utah 1983). 
In the case at bar, Defendants moved for summary 
judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and supported the motion by a Memorandum of 
Points and Authority. (R.226 & 228). The Defendants' 
memorandum listed eleven statements of material fact upon 
which Defendants claim no genuine issues exist. (R.230-
R.233). The Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition listed 
twelve issues that exist regarding material facts that 
must be adjudicated by a trier of fact. A comparison of 
the facts, as set forth in the respective parties' 
memoranda, considered in a light most favorable to the 
Plaintiffs as the resisting party, leads to the only 
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logical conclusion available, that the lower court erred 
in granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
A. Misrepresentations to the Plaintiffs Evans 
Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that Plaintiffs 
purchased their respective lots in the Lakeview Heights 
Subdivision on certain dates. Plaintiffs and Defendants 
also agree that Defendants attached an accurate copy of 
the November 16, 1977, plat of the subdivision. 
Defendants1 omit any reference to the modification of 
the 1977 plat, but Plaintiffs refer to a modification of 
the 1977 plat. The modification raises factual issues 
that must be resolved. 
Also, Defendants1 admit that when the Evans' 
purchased their home they remember "someone telling them 
that Defendants would build a walkway on lot 150, but 
that a home would be built next to the walkway." 
( R . 2 3 1 ) . It was the Defendants who made the 
representations to the Evans at the time of the purchase 
of their lot not only that a walkway would be built on 
lot 150, but that lot 150 was not to be built on because 
it was part of a common area park. (R.315). Further 
more, the Evans state uncategorically that Defendants 
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made subsequent representations to the Evans that any 
construction on lot 150 would improve the value of the 
Evans1 property, that such construction would not block 
their view in any way, and that lot 150 was "too narrow 
to build on" even though the lot was platted for 
construction. (R. 316 and R.Exhibit G, Deposition Page 
32 lines 13 through 15 and R.Exhibit A, the plat map) . 
Defendants represented to the Evans that lot 150 was "too 
narrow to build on", while the plat map showed that the 
lot was to have a twin home built on it. This 
discrepancy not only creates a dispute of material fact, 
but also points to the pivotal issue regarding the truth 
or falsity of the representations and the critical effect 
such have on the outcome of the Plaintiff's case. These 
issues must be adjudicated. 
In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), a 
purchaser of real property brought suit alleging fraud 
and deception and negligent misrepresentation arising out 
of negotiations for the purchase of a particular parcel 
of property. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
dismissal of the Jones' suit, stating that the trier of 
fact must determine the issues of misrepresentation and 
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deception. Id at 1246. The Dugan case is directly on 
point with the case at bar. The discrepancies between 
representations made by Defendants to Plaintiffs and the 
descriptions on the plat map create disputes in material 
facts which must be resolved by the trier of fact. 
The factual disputes arise from deposition 
testimony. Defendants rely on the depositions of Norma 
Evans, page 47, lines 11 through 17, and of Reid Evans, 
page 32, lines 2 through 20, page 34, lines 7 through 25, 
and page 35, lines 1 through 4. (R.231) Plaintiffs rely 
on the depositions of Norma Evans, page 62, lines 1 
through 25, and page 63, lines 1 through 25, and of Reid 
Evans, page 47, lines 11 through 25, page 48, lines 1 
through 25, and page 51 lines 10 through 17. (R.315 & 
316) . 
B. Misrepresentations to the Plaintiffs Masters 
Defendants memorandum in support of their motion 
for summary judgment admitted that when Plaintiffs 
Masters purchased their home, the Defendants told the 
Masters that something "low" would be built across the 
street from them. (R.230). Plaintiffs referred the Court 
below to the rest of the statements made by the 
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Defendants to the Masters, i.e., that the "low" buildings 
would be a rambler and a bungalow, and that the Masters 
would have the horizon view from about Second Street on. 
(R. 314 and 315). Whether a certain horizon view 
existed at the time that Defendants made the 
representations to the Masters is important here, but was 
overlooked by the court below. Furthermore, Defendants' 
representation that Plaintiffs would retain their horizon 
view from Second Street on, which was contrary to what 
actually happened, creates an issue of fact regarding 
justifiable reliance and promissory estoppel which must 
be tried. 
C. Misrepresentations to Plaintiffs Loosemore 
Defendants1 admitted below that when Plaintiffs 
Loosemore purchased their home they were told "nothing 
would be built on lot 150 except a stairway", (R.231) 
even though the existing plat map showed a twin home was 
to be built on that specific lot. (R. Exhibit A to 
Defendants1 Memorandum in Support R.222). Subsequent to 
the purchase of the Loosemore lot, the Defendants 
represented that some construction would be made on Lot 
150 but that the Loosemore's "view was not going to be 
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obstructed by the construction and the construction would 
be very expensive." (R. 315). The pattern of 
misrepresentations and deceit is consistent throughout 
Defendants' conversations with all the Plaintiffs. 
Dismissing Plaintiffs' claims without determining the 
factual disputes arising therefrom was prejudicial error. 
D. Summary Judgment was not proper 
From a review of the facts in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiffs and by giving Plaintiffs the 
benefit of all the inferences which might reasonably be 
drawn from the evidence, Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 
187 (Utah 1987), it is clear that the lower court erred 
when it granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In the instant case, there are genuine issues of material 
fact and law as to whether or not the moving party is 
entitled to judgment. The Utah Supreme Court has left 
little doubt for trial judges as to what the proper 
decision is when confronted with a case like the one at 
bar: 
It would seem from what has been said that 
the position stated by the parties are 
mutually contradictory. Therefore, unless 
upon the basis of the submissions it appears 
for a certainty that either one or the other 
is correct, and therefore, entitled to prevail, 
it is necessary that there be a trial and 
resolution of this dispute between them. 
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Utah Mortgage and Loan Company, Inc. v. Black, 618 P.2d 
43, 44 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). 
The submissions by the parties below in the instant 
case are mutually contradictory and do not indicate for a 
certainty that either Plaintiffs or Defendants are 
correct, and therefore entitled to prevail . It is 
necessary that there be a trial and resolution of the 
dispute between them. This Court should reverse the 
decision of the lower Court and remand this matter for 
trial. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION BUT PRESERVED THE 
CLAIM FOR FRAUD, BECAUSE I F THE 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT FRAUD. IT 
MAY SUPPORT MISREPRESENTATION OR DECEIT. 
T h e P l a i n t i f f s ' C o m p l a i n t i s d r a f t e d i n t h e 
a l t e r n a t i v e . I f t h e t r i e r o f f a c t c a n n o t f i n d f r a u d , 
t h e n t h e t r i e r o f f a c t may f i n d f rom t h e e v i d e n c e 
p r o d u c e d a t t r i a l , t h a t t h e a l l e g e d m i s c o n d u c t o f 
D e f e n d a n t s n e v e r t h e l e s s damaged t h e P l a i n t i f f s and t h u s 
e n t i t l e t h e P l a i n t i f f s t o c o m p e n s a t i o n . The i s s u e s 
r a i s e d i n t h e P l a i n t i f f s second c l a i m f o r r e l i e f i s t h a t 
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Defendants made representations to Plaintiffs that were 
negligent, reckless, and without regard to their truth or 
falsity, that the Plaintiffs reasonably relied to their 
detriment on said representations and were damaged 
thereby. The claim for relief is a claim grounded in 
negligent misrepresentation. 
The law in Utah is well settled that a claim for 
relief may be brought under a theory of negligent 
misrepresentation. Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d at 1246; 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659 (Utah 1967); 
Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P. 2d 382. The 
distinction between a claim for relief grounded in fraud 
and a claim grounded in negligent misrepresentation is 
that the element of "intent" is removed from the claim 
under negligent misrepresentation. The Supreme Court 
declared in Dugan that: 
Thus, in a case where the circumstances impose 
upon the vendor a special duty to know the truth 
of his representations or where the nature of the 
situation is such the vendor is presumed to know 
the facts to which his representation relates, 
a misrepresentation is fraudulent even though not 
made knowingly, willfully or with actual intent to 
deceive." 
Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1246 (emphasis added). 
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court held that 
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" t h e r e may be a cause of act ion for decei t even though 
the misrepresentat ion was not w i l l f u l l y f a l s e . " Jardine 
v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P. 2d a t 661. The Jardine Court 
a l s o n o t e d t h a t an " a c t i o n f o r n e g l i g e n t 
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n d i f f e r s f rom i n t e n t i o n a l 
misrepresentat ion in tha t in the former the represen tor 
makes an a f f i r m a t i v e a s s e r t i o n which is false without 
having used r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e or competence in 
ascer ta in ing the ver i ty of the a s s e r t i o n . " Id . 
Here, the lower cou r t ' s d i smissa l of P l a i n t i f f s ' 
cause of ac t i on for n e g l i g e n t misrepresenta t ion while 
p rese rv ing P l a i n t i f f s ' c laim for fraud i s r e v e r s i b l e 
e r r o r because t h e r e remain i s s u e s of f ac t r ega rd ing 
Defendants' in tent to deceive, Defendants' c a r e l e s s n e s s 
in t h e i r represen ta t ions , and the degree of each. The 
facts of the case a t bar indica te tha t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s 
were made tha t the property was too narrow to build on; 
t ha t P l a i n t i f f s would always have t h e i r view; tha t there 
would be no building constructed on lo t 150; but if there 
was a building constructed on l o t 150, i t would be a low 
b u i l d i n g and i t would increase the value, not decrease 
the value, of the P l a i n t i f f s ' proper ty . 
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F u r t h e r , the lower court failed to give 
consideration to the circumstances of the parties in this 
matter, as it should have. Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d at 
1248. The Defendants were vendors, sophisticated land 
developers and professional financiers. They retained or 
employed licensed real estate salespersons to act as 
their agents in dealing with Plaintiffs. The 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, were not licensed real 
estate agents, nor were they professional financiers or 
seasoned real estate developers. The Plaintiffs were 
merely persons interested in purchasing a home with a 
panoramic view of the Great Salt Lake and the City of 
Ogden. There is no question but that the Defendants were 
much more sophisticated in real estate transactions, and 
this advantageous circumstance should have been, but was 
not, considered by the court below. 
The result of the lower court's decision, in the 
case at bar, to dismiss the Plaintiffs1 claims for relief 
alleging negligent misrepresentation, while requiring 
Plaintiffs to proceed to trial on the claim of fraud 
(requiring the proof of intent or scienter) is not good 
law. The Plaintiffs should be allowed to present, for a 
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j u r i e s ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the elements of both causes of 
ac t ion . Then, i f the jury finds tha t sc ien te r ( in ten t ) 
was p r e s e n t , then Defendants' fraud i s subs tan t i a t ed . 
If, however, the jury finds no sc ien ter but nevertheless 
finds tha t misrepresentat ions of Defendants caused injury 
t o P l a i n t i f f s , t h e n t h e c l a i m f o r n e g l i g e n t 
mis rep resen ta t ion i s subs tant ia ted . This considerat ion 
i s for the jury . The decision by the lower court to deny 
t h i s option to the jury is revers ib le e r r o r . 
The s e p a r a t e causes of a c t i o n as s e t f o r t h in 
P l a i n t i f f s ' Amended Complaint merely d e l i n e a t e the 
po ten t i a l degrees of the egreg iousness of Defendants ' 
conduct. Proving the egregiousness of the conduct of the 
Defendants in t h i s c i v i l case is much l ike proving the 
c u l p a b i l i t y of a defendant in a criminal ac t ion . In a 
c r i m i n a l a c t i o n , t h e D e f e n d a n t may be c h a r g e d 
c o n c u r r e n t l y wi th more than one crime for the same 
c r imina l a c t , t h e a d d i t i o n a l c h a r g e s b e i n g l e s s e r 
included of fenses . The prosecutor then proves as many 
elements of each crime as poss ible , and the t r i e r of fact 
de termines which crime, if any, f i t s the conduct. The 
evidence may not support conviction for the more 
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egregious crime, but may be sufficient to convict for the 
lesser included offense. 
In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs should be 
allowed the opportunity to present all of the facts, 
pursuant to the rules of evidence, to the trier of fact 
for a determination of the egregiousness of the conduct 
of the Defendants. At the conclusion of the trial, the 
trier of fact will be able to determine whether or not 
there was a breach of fiduciary duty, whether there were 
breaches of covenants, whether there was a breach of 
easements for air and light, etc., whether the conduct of 
the Defendants was accomplished with intent to defraud 
the P l a i n t i f f s , or whether the D e f e n d a n t s ' 
representatives were made negligently and/or recklessly 
without regard to the truth or falsity thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the lower court 
erred in granting Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants therefore pray the Court to 
reverse the lower court's Order granting Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and to remand the matter to 
the lower court for trial. This Court should grant 
whatever other relief it deems appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s /J day of 
September, 1988. 
W. REEVE 
>UGLAS M. DURBANO 
JOHN H. GEILMANN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed and/or hand 
delivered four true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Appellants1 Brief to Donald Dalton and John Snow at Van 
Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 50 South Main, Suite 
1600, P.O. Box 445340, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84145. 
DATED this day of September, 1988. 
Secretary 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM M. MASTERS and HELEN C. 
MASTERS, REID EVANS and NORMA T. 
EVANS, JAMES R. LOOSEMORE 
and BARBARA J. LOOSEMORE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ] 
THE LAKEVIEW HEIGHTS HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit ] 
corporation, HONOLULU FEDERAL 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a 
Hawaii corporation, BEN LOMOND 
ESTATES, a Utah general 
partnership, and P. CLAY THOMAS, ] 
Defendants. ] 
I RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
l FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
/ 
Case No. 93329 
At oral argument, plaintiff fairly well conceded that/ 
of the seven causes of action, they were relying primarily on the 
fraud and the breach of fiduciary duty, and that the other causes 
of action, private nuisance, violation of easements of light, air 
and view, breach of declaration of convenants, etc., were 
basically window dressing. 
Plaintiff runs together the allegation of fraud in the 
inducement in regard to the purchase of the property, and an 
allegation of fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining their, 
plaintiffs', signing of a variance for change in permissible 
building on Lot 150. It appears quite clear that they were not 
required or necessary to the obtaining of the variance, and if 
there were representations made that were not followed through, 
4-uA^ 4 c incnffiripnt- facts to show that said reoresentaitons 
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Ruling on Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Case No. 93329 
In regard to the fraud allegation in the representations 
made at the time of purchaser I must admit that I have had some 
problem with this. However, in considering a summary judgment, 
it must be considered in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, it appears there is sufficent issue of fact 
to retain this issue for trial. Defendants1 motion in regard to 
the cause of action for fraud is denied insofar as it has to do 
with the alleged misrepresentations made at the time of purchase. 
As to breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiffs' have shown 
nothing that would support such an allegation. Plaintiffs tend 
to cite cases and phrasing of cases which sound good, but do not 
necessarily support their position. Even taking the facts most 
favorable to the plaintiffs, they establish nothing that would 
indicate a fiduciary duty on the part of the defendants. 
Plaintiffs tend to argue along the lines that they had superior 
information and did not tell the plaintiffs, and at the same time 
argue that what they did tell them constitutes fraud. 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in all causes 
of action except for fraud in the inducement at the time of 
purchase. 
In regard to dismissing defendant Honolulu Federal 
Savings and Loan, I again have a problem with plaintiffs' 
position and their briefs. They tend to rely upon allegations, 
and an affidavit that tends to rely upon belief. The affidavit, 
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Ruling on Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Case No. 93329 
however, does make some factual statements that if considered in 
the best light, might well be considered as sufficient. For the 
time being, I grant the plaintiffs the benefit of my expressed 
doubts and the motion is denied. 
DATED this f J^day of Marchr 1988. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this iCp day of March, 1988, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was 
served upon the following: 
Douglas M. Durbano 
DURBANO, SMITH & REEVE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 320 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
John A. Snow 
Donald L. Dalton 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MC CARTHY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8414 
PAULA CARR, Secretary 
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John A. Snow (3025) ^ft,L 
Donald L. Dalton (4305) ' 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM M. MASTERS and 
HELEN C. MASTERS, husband 
and wife, REID EVANS and 
NORMA T. EVANS, husband and 
wife, and JAMES R. L00SEM0RE 
and BARBARA J. LOOSEMORE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE LAKEVIEW HEIGHTS 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah Non-Profit 
Corporation, HONOLULU 
FEDERAL SAVINGS St LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, a Hawaii 
Corporation, BEN LOMOND 
ESTATES, a Utah General 
Partnership, and P. CLAY 
THOMAS, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 93329 
This matter came before the Court on January 22 and 
February 19, 1988 on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Donald L. Dalton appearing for defendants and Douglas M. 
Durbano and Kenlon W. Reeve appearing for plaintiffs. The 
Court having heard the arguments of counsel and reviewed the 
record in this case, and for the reasons stated in the Court's 
Ruling on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment signed on 
March 15, 1988, good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
is granted and this action is dismissed with prejudice except 
for the claim appearing in the First Cause of Action of 
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint based on misrepresentations made 
at or before the time plaintiffs purchased their homes. 
Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court determines that there is no just reason 
for delay and directs entry of final judgment as to all of the 
claims that were dismissed above. 
DATED this JJ%_ day of C^C? , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
^Te^f^ Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde \ 
Second Judicial DistrictrJCourt 
Approved as to form: 
as M. Durbano 
on W. Reeve 
rneys for Plaintiffs 
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